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The shape of an electoral district may suggest whether it was drawn
with political motivations, or gerrymandered. For this reason, quanti-
fying the shape of districts, in particular their compactness, is a key
task in politics and civil rights. A growing body of literature suggests
and analyzes compactness measures mathematically, but little con-
sideration has been given to how these scores should be calculated
in practice. Here, we consider the effects of a number of decisions
that must be made in interpreting and implementing a set of popular
compactness scores. We show that the choices made in quantify-
ing compactness may themselves become political tools, with seem-
ingly innocuous decisions leading to disparate scores. We show
that when the full range of implementation flexibility is used, it can
be abused to make clearly gerrymandered districts appear quantita-
tively reasonable. This complicates using compactness as a legisla-
tive or judicial standard to counteract unfair redistricting practices.
This paper accompanies the release of packages in C++, Python, and
R which correctly, efficiently, and reproducibly calculate a variety of
compactness scores.
geographic information system (GIS) | open source software | redistrict-
ing | gerrymandering | geometry
Gerrymandering is the practice of designing political dis-tricts whose shape serves some agenda. Reasons for
gerrymandering range from fundamental concerns like equal
representation to less ethical considerations like disenfran-
chising a minority population. Although contorted shapes
can arise from geographic or legal necessity, such as rivers
or the boundaries of political superunits, poor geometry is
often associated with a political agenda. Thus, detection and
quantification of geometric quality is a key consideration in
efforts to make redistricting standards systematic, though not
the only one. (1)
The compactness of a district is a key geometric considera-
tion intended to capture the issues above. Many measures of
compactness exist (2–4), and an ongoing discussion between
mathematicians and legislators continues to debate their rela-
tive merits in promoting desirable district shapes. There has
been less discussion, however, about how compactness scores
should be implemented in practice.
Here, we the US Census Bureau’s 2015 Cartographic Bound-
ary and TIGER/Line data (5) to consider how the variables
used to calculate compactness are complicated by reality and
how, even once defined, issues including geography, topogra-
phy, projections, and resolution complicate implementation.
Together, the ambiguities we expose provide a high degree of
implementation flexibility. We show that this flexibility can be
exploited to argue that convoluted and likely gerrymandered
districts are quantitatively reasonable.
We conclude with general recommendations for develop-
ment and fair characterization of compactness scores; we addi-
tionally provide a model software implementation intended to
avoid the pitfalls we highlight. All of the examples presented
and some of the terminology used stem from United States
geopolitics, but the ideas presented herein are applicable to
redistricting more broadly.
1. Results
We have identified a number of choices that must be made
to compute a compactness score. In addition to the choice of
(1) compactness definition, it is also important to consider how
to handle (2) non-contiguous districts, (3) districts with holes,
(4) political superunit boundaries, (5) map projections, (6) to-
pography, (7) data resolution, (8) floating-point uncertainty,
and (9) whether alternative choies were possible in drawing
a district’s boundaries. These are considered independently
below.
In combination, these choices provide potentially undesir-
able implementation flexibility. This flexibility can be abused:
Different implementation choices applied to what is nominally
the same data lead to very different conclusions about fairness
of a districting plan.
To demonstrate this effect, we have selected ten U.S. Con-
gressional Districts widely considered to be gerrymandered.
Using an optimizer, we apply the full flexibility detailed in this
paper and are able to find sets of implementation decisions
for which these districts’ compactness scores are outliers when
compared against the full distribution of districts’ scores. We
are also able to find sets of decisions which make these districts
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Fig. 1. Applied gerrymandering: abusing implementation flexibility. This figure shows several districts from the 114th Congress that appear incontrovertibly gerrymandered.
The compactness scores of all the districts are shown in histograms below the districts’ pictures with a black line indicating where the focal district falls on the distribution.
Compactness ranges from 0 on the left-hand side of each histogram to 1 on the right-hand side. Scores for districts were generated by performing a grid search over a range of
values for each implementation choice and choosing the minimum/maximum value across all choices. The grid search could also choose whether or not to include sole districts
(§F) in the histogram. The result for each district is the pair of configurations in which the district appeared both the most gerrymandered as well as the most reasonable.
Further details for the figure are in the Supplemental Information (see Table 1).
appear reasonable. That is, we can exploit implementation
flexibility to build a seemingly reasonable argument that these
districts are both gerrymandered and not.
Figure 1 shows the effects of this adversarial choice of
parameters. In the case of NC01, IL04, and PA07, it was
possible to move the districts from obvious outliers to middle-
of-the-pack status. In other cases, such as NC12, NC04, and
TX35, this was not possible, but the districts can still be
moved considerably closer to the mean, countering arguments
that they are outliers.
The optimizer does not need to use extreme settings to
produce the desired results. For example, TX33 appears
most gerrymandered using the CvxHullPTB score (scores are
defined below) at a 500m simplification tolerance in a locally-
optimized Lambert conformal conic projection all districts
included in the distribution; it appears least gerrymandered
using the ReockPT score with a 500m tolerance in a Gall
projection with districts comprising an entire state excluded.
A. Open Source Tools. Of the many compactness scores dis-
cussed in the literature, some are better able to cope with the
complexities discussed here than others. Many of the more
robust metrics, however, are also difficult or impossible to
calculate using commonly-available software. For instance,
QGIS (6) includes the area of multipolygons as a built-in dis-
play field, convex hulls as a function three menu levels deep,
and has no functionality to calculate the minimum bound-
ing circles needed for Reock scores. Other scores, such as
bizarreness (4) have mathematical descriptions of a complex
calculation, but no associated source code.
To address this situation, we have released a family of
open source packages which share a common library designed
to efficiently, reproducibly, and correctly calculate a vari-
ety of compactness scores. The basis of this ecosystem is
compactnesslib,∗ a C++ library and associated command-
line interface which ingests bulk or single data in a va-
riety of formats and calculates compactness scores. The
python-mander Python package† (available via pip‡) and the
mandeR R package§ provide high-level interfaces to this li-
brary. In addition, a QGIS plugin¶ provides GIS users an
easy means of calculating scores (7–10). This stack was uti-
lized to produce the calculations in this paper: The complete
source code for generating all the diagrams presented here
∗https://github.com/gerrymandr/compactnesslib
†https://github.com/gerrymandr/python-mander
‡https://pypi.python.org/pypi/mander
§https://github.com/gerrymandr/mandeR
¶https://github.com/gerrymandr/qgis-compactness
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is available at github.com/r-barnes/Barnes2018-compactness-
implementation.
B. Coda. The measurement of compactness can be used as a
tool to help detect and quantify gerrymandering. Numerous
engineering and implementation decisions, however, must be
made to calculate a score. Whether used unintentionally or
maliciously, this flexibility has strong bearing on the quality
of compactness measurements and can be leveraged to shape
conclusions about the quality of a districting plan.
Beyond providing “best practices” for implementations of
compactness standards, we intend the open source software ac-
companying this paper as a first step toward fair and accurate
measurement of compactness, allowing scientists, politicians,
and the public to evaluate aspects of their democracy using re-
producible, mathematically well-founded, and computationally
stable tools.
Finally, we remind the reader that the goal of all of this
is to help governments represent their people. Compactness,
while attractive as a quantitative metric, is a tool, not the
end-game.
2. Discussion
A. Best Practices. The foregoing highlights the importance
of being clear about how a score is calculated. In general, a
mathematical definition alone is not sufficient: Attention must
be paid to data and algorithmic quality. Here, we suggest best
practices for the calculation of compactness scores:
• Scores. Be explicit about what each variable in a com-
pactness score means. Does area include holes? Is it
constrained by political superunits? How should non-
contiguous districts be handled? Score names should be
distinct and informative. Appending a clarifying suffix to
the name of a score (e.g. PTSHp) informs readers as to
what is being done. See our Methods for examples.
• Projections. Scale distortion should be limited to less
than 1.25% throughout the region of interest. Reasonable
choices of national or local projections usually suffice.
• Resolution. Use the best available resolution from a
trusted source. Simplified or down-scaled data give altered
results. Alternatively, choose a score which is robust to
changes in resolution: hull-based scores seem to do well in
this regard. The U.S. Census Bureau produces reasonable
data designed such that all borders that are at the same
resolution align. Ideally, districting data should be drawn
from a common, trusted, non-partisan source, regardless
of who is performing an analysis.
• Border constraints. Scores which do not explicitly
account for constraints imposed by superunit boundaries
leave out valuable information about what was possible
in drawing a district. That is, they may unfairly penalize
a district for having an odd shape when no other shape
was possible. Use a score that accounts for superunit
borders. Be sure that borders are cropped to features
such as major coastlines.
• Choice. Before doing statistics on a set of district plans,
eliminate those districts which encompass an entire polit-
ical superunit, as no other choices of shape were possible.
• Topography. We have not found including topography
in the calculation of area to be a significant source of
error, assuming the use of acceptable map projections.
• Border coalignment. Coalignment of borders is a con-
cern, though the effect was small in our data. To avoid
problems, datasets used in an analysis should always be
at the same resolution and carefully coaligned during
their creation. In the U.S., Census data satisfies these
requirements.
• Floating-point considerations. We have not found
the choice of single- or double-precision floating-point
representations to be important in our calculations.
• Transparency. A compactness score should not be ac-
cepted and cannot be interpreted without knowing the
steps that went into creating it. From a scientific stand-
point this relates strongly to reproducibility: We cannot
trust what we cannot reproduce. Therefore, documenta-
tion is needed down to the equation level, and the release
of source code is critical (11–13).
B. Policy Implications. While the U.S. court system has de-
clared that egregious gerrymandering is unconstitutional (14–
16), the courts have thus far declined to adopt a quantitative
standard by which gerrymandering can be judged; however,
they have left open the possibility that a “workable standard”
exists. (17) This paper demonstrates that any standard must
be specified precisely and carefully, since differences in interpre-
tation can have large effects on scores. Furthermore, this paper
demonstrates that even a well-specified standard may judge un-
reasonable districts as being reasonable (see Figure 1). There-
fore, any legally-mandated standard of compactness should
leave open the possibility of challenges. Additionally, given
the implementation flexibility discussed here and its potential
for abuse, courts should not accept quantitative arguments
unless the code used to build those arguments is made publicly
accessible.
3. Materials and Methods
A. Definitions of Compactness. There are over 24 different
measures of compactness in the literature, and no doubt many
others exist. The measures break down into roughly five
categories: (1) length vs. width, (2) area ratios, (3) perimeter-
to-area ratios, (4) other geometric measures (moment of in-
ertia, interior angles, &c.), and (5) measures incorporating
population or other such information. (2, 3)
In this paper, we consider three widely-used compactness
scores and their variants (Figure 2 provides a depiction):
1. Polsby-Popper (18): 4piA/P 2 where A is the area of a
district and P its perimeter
2. Reock (19): the ratio of a district’s area to the area of its
minimum bounding circle. Note that finding this circle
is harder than locating the two most distant points of a
district; an efficient algorithm and associated implemen-
tation is described in (20).
3. Convex Hull (3): the ratio of a district’s area to the area
of its convex a hull (the minimum convex shape that
completely contains the district).
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ReockPT=0.26 CvxHullPT=0.44
ReockPS=0.26 CvxHullPS=0.58
Fig. 2. Reock and Convex Hull scores for Louisiana 01 shown with both the PS and
PT interpretation depicted. It is coincidental that ReockPT and ReockPS are the
same here. Note that for both of the ReockPT and CvxHullPT scores the hull polygons
overlap; this is potentially problematic since it could be considered double-counting.
All of the above scores are in the range [0, 1] with higher
values indicating greater compactness. Districts with relatively
low values might be suspected of having been gerrymandered.
Note that these scores are purely geometric; it may be that
scores incorporating population densities or other demographic
data provide a better means of measuring gerrymandering, but
we do not pursue this direction in our discussion. It is likely
that incorporating such additional data would exacerbate the
issues we discuss.
B. Nomenclature. All of these measures are under-defined:
They assume that an electoral district is described by a sin-
gle polygon without any holes. In reality, districts, such as
those with islands (see Figure 2), often are comprised of many
polygons. While holes in districts are rarer, they do occur. To
resolve these difficulties, we suggest methods be defined with
specific reference to multiple polygons and holes.
Here, whether or not contiguity is accounted for in a score
will be indicated by the suffixes PT (polygons together) and
PS (polygons separate). Whether or not holes are accounted
for will be indicated by the suffixes AH (add holes) and SH
(subtract holes). If there is ambiguity regarding whether area,
perimeter, or some other quantity is being treated in this way,
then terms such as PTaSHp (treat the area of the polygons
together, subtract the perimeter of holes) may be used. The
suffix B indicates that a score accounts for constraints imposed
by the boundaries of political superunits.
C. Non-contiguous Districts. There is no federal requirement
that districts be contiguous, nor do many states require it.
Indeed, the presence of islands (e.g. Hawaii) can make contigu-
ity an impossibility. Non-contiguity may arise in other ways.
Civil rights considerations have given Louisiana 01, depicted
in Figure 2, two large portions separated by Louisiana 02;
Louisiana 02 was drawn as a majority-minority district follow-
ing the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Wisconsin’s
61st Assembly District (Figure 5) exemplifies a different situa-
tion. The city of Racine, WI, had a non-contiguous boundary
as a by-product of annexation, yet Wisconsin required that
its districts be composed entirely of wards. As a result, the
district itself is non-contiguous and could not legally be drawn
in any other way (21). For the 114th Congress 1:500,000 res-
olution data, 84 of 441 districts are non-contiguous. Of the
non-contiguous districts the largest number of subdivisions
was 580 (in Alaska) and the median was 5.
The question then is whether a district should be treated
as a single unit or several independent units. Treating the
district as a single unit by, e.g., enclosing it in a single hull,
will tend to result in lower compactness scores indicative of
gerrymandering. Treating the district as a separate units and
summing the areas of the units’ enclosing hulls will result in
higher compactness scores indicating less gerrymandering.
Mathematically speaking, although Polsby-Popper is usu-
ally calculated as being proportional to A
P2 , there are at least
two possibilities for extending this formula to non-contiguous
districts, in particular
∑
i
Ai
P2
i
and (
∑
i
Ai)/(
∑
i
P 2i ), where i
enumerates the non-contiguous subregions of the district. Note
that although the original Polsby-Popper score is bound to the
range [0, 1], this is not true of the first of these alternatives.
Here, we use the latter alternative.
Ultimately, special attention should be given to non-
contiguous districts to determine whether they result from
natural features, legitimate legal requirements, or electoral
engineering. Figure 7 shows the effect the foregoing inter-
pretations can have on compactness scores. The wide gap
between different interpretations of what is nominally the
same score supports the need for exactitude in both language
and implementation.
D. Holes. Holes are relatively rare in districting, but many
of the same considerations apply. Wisconsin 61, discussed
previously, has a legally-mandated hole (Figure 5). Texas 18
very nearly surrounds the urban core of Houston and could, in
a low-resolution dataset, be assigned a hole. Holes also appear
as artifacts of the digitization process (Figure 8). For the
114th Congress 1:500,000 resolution data, four of 441 districts
have holes as artifacts.
E. Borders. Districts are constrained by borders imposed by
higher geopolitical units as well as by nature. Compactness
scores that do not account for such constraints may assign
inappropriately low scores to a district. The panhandles of
Florida and Oklahoma, as well as Kentucky’s border with the
Ohio River (see Figure 4), contain electoral districts whose
shape, at least in part, cannot be dictated by politics. The
same is true of almost any coastal district since islands and
peninsulas must be included, but lengthen their perimeters.
Louisiana (see Figure 4) exmplifies this.
Some scores can be modified to account for this issue. They
can be marked with the suffix B (borders accounted for). For
example, in the case of the convex hull and Reock scores, if
the hull or minimum bounding circle is intersected with a
state polygon, the result is a better representation of what
was possible and, therefore, a better indicator of whether
gerrymandering took place. Taking this into account can have
a considerable impact on compactness scores (Figure 9). Those
scores, such as the Polsby-Popper, which cannot be modified
to account for borders, are calculated as described elsewhere
without consideration of borders.
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Fig. 3. Electoral districts of the 114th Congress including maritime regions. Two
datasets of electoral districts are overlaid. The gray area depicts electoral district
boundaries cropped to coastlines whereas the dashed red line indicates the full extent
of the electoral districts. Note the growth of the district’s areas and the relative smooth-
ness of the perimeters. Data was drawn from the US Census Bureau (5): cropped
data is from the Cartographic Boundaries dataset, e.g. cb_2015_us_cd114_rr.zip,
whereas uncropped data is from the TIGER/Line dataset, e.g., tl_2015_us_cd114.shp.
The boundaries of electoral districts, states, and countries
may include large maritime regions, as shown in Figure 3.
Insofar as these regions generally cannot be populated, save
for areas immediately adjacent to the shore, their inclusion
in compactness calculations may serve to hide the effects
of gerrymandering. Input data should be cropped to major
coastlines to account for this, though, doing so is not a panacea:
coastlines tend to be fractal (see Figure 14).
As Figure 6 shows, border data, especially when drawn from
disparate sources, may not always co-align. We attempted to
quantify this effect by overlaying high-resolution district data
with medium-resolution state data and found that the impact
was usually small (see Figure 10 for details). Problems can be
avoided entirely by using data which is co-aligned, such as is
available from the U.S. Census.
F. Choice. If only one possible plan exists for a district, that
district cannot be gerrymandered and should be excluded
from analysis. In the Census Bureau data (5) used here,
13 congressional districts, including Alaska, Delaware, and
Vermont, had only one congressional district. No matter how
oddly shaped these districts are, they are not gerrymandered.
G. Projections. Although scores are often defined as though
districts exist on a plane, in reality districts are wrapped
around the curvature of the Earth and local topographical fea-
tures. Several interpretations of scores are possible: districts
could be mapped to the plane using a projection designed to
minimize distortion across an entire country, a subdivision of a
country such as a state, or even the district itself. Alternatively,
variables could be calculated on the sphere or WGS84 ellipsoid.
As Figure 11 shows, despite all the possibilities, compactness
measures appear to be stable to reasonable choices among local-
ized (country-scale) map projections used in practice. Alaska
demonstrates what happens when an unreasonable choice is
made: its score in a projection suitable for the conterminous
United States differs that in an Alaska-specific projection by
up to 20%.
Clearly, using a global projection such as the standard
Mercator induces too much distortion. This implies that Web
Mercator (EPSG:3857) should never be used for compactness
calculations, despite its ubiquitous use on the internet. Across
all districts, scores, and projections, the absolute score dif-
ference between a district as measured in a locally-optimal
projection versus a conterminous projection was less than
0.009 in 99% of cases. The other 1% of cases comprise districts
such as Alaska and American Somoa, which are outside the
region of interest for the conterminous projections. Given
this, nation-sized projections—excluding outlying states and
territories—are likely reasonable choices. Quantitatively, the
conterminous Albers Equal Area (EPSG:102003) projection
has a maximum scale distortion of 1.25% (22): this value hence
can be taken as an upper limit on what is acceptable for any
projection and is our recommended choice for districts in the
conterminous United States.
H. Topography. A different effect of mapping electoral dis-
tricts to a plane is that topography, such as mountains, is
left out of quantities such as area and perimeter. As a re-
sult, the true land area and overland distance between points
is under-estimated. Using the 30m USGS National Eleva-
tion Dataset (23), we calculated the surface area of districts
using RichDEM’s implementation (24) of an algorithm by
Jenness (25) and modeled perimeter as the summed length
of all the raster elevation cells at the edge of a district. The
difference in Polsby-Popper scores between the topographic
and non-topographic data was less than 0.03 for all districts,
with 75% of districts having deviations less than 0.005. This
should be expected given that Kansas (and every other state)
is provably flatter than a pancake. (26)
I. Resolution. Resolution can be thought of as the density
of points describing a boundary. Figure 4 shows the same
district at several resolutions; lower resolutions lead to simpler
shapes usually, but not always, by reducing the length of the
perimeter. The U.S. Census Bureau releases boundary data
of Congressional Districts in four resolutions: full, 1:500k,
1:5M, and 1:20M (5). The full-resolution data is available as
“TIGER/Line” data whereas the other resolutions are available
as “Cartographic Boundary Shapefiles.” At these resolutions
the perimeters of the districts of the 114th Congress are defined
by an average of 8914, 1531, 322, and 70 points, respectively.
As services move online and onto mobile devices with con-
strained processing, it will be tempting for practitioners to
introduce lower-resolution or simplified data into compactness
measurements. Even in the high-performance environments
used for automated redistricting efforts (27), low-resolution
data is tempting as it may yield substantial savings on com-
pute time. Ultimately, we find that the choice of resolution has
a substantial impact on compactness scores (Figure 13 and 15)
with the Polsby-Popper score especially affected. This adds to
a growing list of criticisms of the Polsby-Popper score. (1, 4)
Since data may be supplied to users by outside sources,
adversarial inputs are possible: A high-frequency wave applied
to the boundary of a district may be visually imperceptible
while introducing substantial alterations to a district’s score.
The Koch snowflake is an extreme example of this: It has an
arbitrarily-long perimeter surrounding a finite area (Figure 14).
More practically, data may contain digitization or simplifica-
tion artifacts that only become apparent under significant
magnification, as shown in Figure 8.
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PP
0.38
PP
0.48
PP
0.55
PP
0.03
PP
0.06
PP
0.15
CH
0.78
CH
0.83
CH
0.79
CH
0.58
CH
0.60
CH
0.67
Kentucky 03 Louisiana 01
Fig. 4. Effect of polygon simplification on districts and their compactness scores. Districts from the 114th Congress are shown at 1:500,000 (500k), 1:5,000,000 (5m),
and 1:20,000,000 (20m) resolution. Simplification was performed by the US Census Bureau using in-house algorithms that ensure border alignment. Here, PP stands for
PolsbyPTAH while CH stands for CvxHullPT; note how these scores change with resolution. Kentucky 03 encompasses metropolitan Louisville and is bounded on the north by
Kentucky’s state border and the Ohio River. Louisiana 01 is bounded by the Mississippi Delta, divided by Louisiana 02, and includes unexpected parts of New Orleans. Note
that under simplification the rough edges of Kentucky 03 disappear, as do entire bays and islands in Louisiana 01.
4. Ordering
The foregoing considerations change not only what the values
of the calculated scores are, but also the relative ordering of
the scores (Figure 16). If this is quantified using Spearman’s
rank correlation coefficient (Figure 17), it is apparent that
different scores give markedly different rankings. Thus, any
ranking of districts by compactness is thoroughly tied to and
arises from choices made in developing the scores. Figure 1
explores this issue further.
5. Floating-point Issues
Computers generally store fractional values based on the
IEEE754 specification using either the 32-bit single-precision
type, which gives about 7 decimal places of precision, or the
64-bit double-precision type, which gives about 15 decimal
places of precision. In terms of decimal degrees, the former
provides approximately centimeter accuracy while the latter
provides nanometer accuracy; thus, single-precision is suffi-
cient for storing geographic coordinates. However, performing
mathematics on fractional numbers, especially 32-bit types, is
known to give potentially erroneous results (28).
We tested for this by computing all of the scores mentioned
here using both 32-bit and 64-bit IEE754 compliant types,
with the latter taken as the “true” value. No score had a
percent difference between the two of more than 0.027%.
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Supplemental Information
Fig. 5. Wisconsin’s 61st Assembly District showing non-contiguous regions. See text
for discussion. Figure drawn from (30).
Fig. 6. Misaligned borders. The border shown lies between Maryland 06 and West
Virginia 01. The “true boundary” is drawn from data at 1:500,000 resolution and
is shown by the transition between greys, while the black line represents the state
boundary between the two districts and is drawn from 1:5,000,000 data. Note that
differing data resolutions is only one way whereby such a mismatch might occur:
shifts in data (as from projections), differing collection procedures, or deliberate
manipulation are all possible.
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Fig. 7. Absolute value of differences in definitions of scores for districts of the 114th
Congress. Shown are CvxHullPT vs. CvxHullPS and ReockPT vs. ReockPS. Districts
are only shown if their score changed between definitions and they were part of a
multi-district state, giving 47 data points for CvxHull and 38 for Reock. The data
resolution was 1:500,000.
Fig. 8. Holes, islands, and narrow regions. The region shown is drawn from Wis-
consin’s Assembly Districts (30) and shows how bad digitization or subsequent
simplification can lead to subtle data issues which may not be visually apparent
without significant magnification. Note that many borders are axially-aligned, this
may reflect reality, but may also be an artifact arising from discretization of input data,
demarcation choices, simplification algorithms, or even our own visualization software.
Regardless, axial alignment renders useless many simple geometric algorithms and
invokes special cases in others; therefore, implementations of scoring algorithms
require care.
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District Score Value Diff from Mean Score Name Tolerance Projection Choice
MD03 0.28 0.48 Mercator 5000 CvxHullPTB nochoice
MD03 0.58 0.09 Local LCC 500 ReockPTB nochoice
NC12 0.29 0.5 Local AEA 5000 CvxHullPTB nochoice
NC12 0.03 0.17 Mollweide 0 PolsbyPopp choice
MD02 0.42 0.35 Robinson 5000 CvxHullPTB nochoice
MD02 0.49 0 Local LCC 1000 ReockPTB nochoice
FL05 1 0.52 Local AEA 5000 ReockPTB choice
FL05 0.04 0.16 Mollweide 0 PolsbyPopp choice
NC01 0.26 0.32 EPSG:102003 5000 Schwartzbe nochoice
NC01 0.37 0 Gall 100 ReockPS choice
PN07 0.47 0.31 Local LCC 5000 CvxHullPTB nochoice
PN07 0.35 0.02 Gall 500 ReockPT choice
TX33 0.43 0.33 Local LCC 500 CvxHullPTB nochoice
TX33 0.25 0.12 Gall 500 ReockPT choice
NC04 0.34 0.43 Gall 5000 CvxHullPTB nochoice
NC04 0.15 0.14 Mollweide 50 ReockPT nochoice
IL04 0.42 0.34 Local LCC 50 CvxHullPTB nochoice
IL04 0.27 0.06 Robinson 1000 ReockPT nochoice
TX35 0.36 0.41 Mollweide 5000 CvxHullPTB nochoice
TX35 0.05 0.15 Mollweide 0 PolsbyPopp choice
Table 1. Applied gerrymandering: abusing implementation flexibility. This table shows the choices made to produce the histograms shown in
Figure 1. Recall that each of district which appeared incontrovertibly gerrymandered was paired with two histograms, one of which made the
district’s compactness score seem like an outlier and the other of which made it seem reasonable. The districts’ scores are listed here, along
with the absolute value of their difference from the mean of the distribution. The set of implementation choices made for each distribution
is also shown: the compactness score, the simplification tolerance of the data, the map projection, and whether or not districts which
comprised the entirety of their political superunit (districts in which a choice of boundaries was not possible) were included.
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Fig. 9. Effects of constraining compactness measures using the boundaries of
political superunits for the 144th Congress. The convex hull and, for the Reock score,
the minimum bounding circle were cropped to state borders before being used to
calculate scores. Only districts which were part of multi-district states and whose
scores changed are shown: 215 for the convex hull and 320 for the Reock, of 441
total. District and state data were at 1:500,000 resolution.
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Fig. 10. Approximate percent uncertainty in area introduced by border misalignment.
Each dot represents one congressional district. Areas with especially high uncertainty
are usually coastal where the lower resolution data introduce significant areas of
water into a district. Using the data from Figure 6, an exclusive-or on each district and
state yielded areas of misalignment. Districts and states were shrunk and expanded
to form border outlines which were intersected with the exclusive-or thereby limiting
misalignment to border areas. The remaining area divided by the original, high-
resolution areas gives the percentage. A few especially small districts (< 10 km2)
were culled from the analysis as this method made the entirety of the districts uncertain.
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Fig. 11. Change in score between a locally-optimized projection and regionally- and
globally-optimized projections for all electoral districts of the 114th Congress. Each dis-
trict was projected into locally-fitted Lambert Conformal Conic and Albers Equal Area
Conic projections; into conterminous US-fitted Albers Equal Area (EPSG:102003),
Lambert Conformal Conic (EPSG:102004), and Equidistant Conic (EPSG:102005)
projections; and into globally-fitted Mercator, Robinson, Molleweide, and Gall stere-
ographic projections. For each district, the maximum range between any value in
the local group and any value in the conterminous (CONUS) and global groups was
calculated. For the conterminous projections, boxplot bodies appear as thin black
lines indicating the bulk of districts experienced negligible change under different
projections: in fact the 99th quantile score across all districts was 0.009. The outlier
is Alaska, for which a conterminous projection should never be used due to excessive
distortion. If the entire United States, including Hawaii and Alaska, needs to be
processed at once, Snyder’s GS50 projection (31) is a good choice as it provides
< 2% scale distortion throughout the this region. Data was at 1:500,000 resolution.
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Fig. 12. Difference in Polsby-Popper scores calculated accounting for topography
and assuming planar topography. Topography-inclusive area of districts was calcu-
lated using the 30 m USGS National Elevation Dataset. (23) Districts were cropped
using 1:500,000 resolution boundaries from the US Census Bureau for the 114th
Congress. (5) Surface area was calculated using RichDEM’s implementation (24) of
an algorithm by (25). Perimeter was taken as the summed length of all the cells at the
edge of a district and was constant with respect to topographic considerations.
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Fig. 13. Effect of resolution on compactness scores. Scores were calculated for
districts from the 114th Congress at resolutions 1:500,000 (500k), 1:5,000,000 (5m),
and 1:20,000,000 (20m). Score differences versus the 1:500,000 values are shown for
those districts whose scores changed. Area and perimeter values are log transformed.
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PolsbyPopp 0.45345 0.28341 0.16650 0.09543 0.05412 0.03056 0.01722 0.00969
Schwartzbe 0.67339 0.53236 0.40805 0.30892 0.23264 0.17480 0.13121 0.09845
CvxHullPS 0.66667 0.74074 0.77366 0.78829 0.79480 0.79769 0.79897 0.79954
ReockPS 0.55133 0.61259 0.63981 0.65191 0.65729 0.65968 0.66074 0.66122
Fig. 14. The Koch Snowflake (32) shown for its first 8 levels of resolution (the 0th level is omitted). Note that at each resolution both the shape and boundary of the snowflake
are visually similar, especially at higher resolutions. Despite this, levels have markedly different scores. For each increase in resolution the Polsby-Popper score decreases by
77% and the Schwartzberg score by 33%. After initial increases, the Convex Hull and Reock scores stabilize.
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Fig. 15. Effect of polygon simplification on compactness scores. Districts from the
114th Congress were simplified by shapely (33) using a topologically-preserving
algorithm from GEOS (34) with the indicated tolerances.
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Fig. 16. Implementation affects ranking. Here, the compactness scores for the 114th
Congress at 1:500,000 resolution are plotted for two different interpretations of the
convex hull score. Only the 136 districts whose score changed as a result of the
differing interpretations are shown.
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Fig. 17. Correlations of rankings. Rankings of compactness scores for the 114th
Congress at 1:500,000 resolution are compared against each other using Spearman’s
rank correlation coefficient. A value of one indicates perfect agreement of relative
rankings while a value of zero indicates no correlation.
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